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In Irresolute Testators, Professor Jane Baron provocatively 
suggests the existence of two distinct types of testators: the 
rational, autonomous testator who has made deliberate choices 
about the contents of her will and whose errors, if any, are minor; 
and the more vulnerable, less resolute testator who may not have 
actually made the final decisions enshrined in a formal will. To 
illustrate how these testators appear in wills law, she analyzes 
how courts apply the doctrines of harmless error and mistake 
reformation. While the two doctrines appear to be intended to help 
the resolute testator, courts instead, she suggests, also apply the 
doctrines to help the irresolute testator. In causing us to reflect on 
the distinctions between dispository intent and a formal writing 
recognizable as a final statement, on rational and boundedly 
rational testators, on final and almost-final declarations, her 
article focuses us on the art of line-drawing in wills law. In this 
commentary, I explore another context that similarly raises issues 
about testators whose final intent is not clearly expressed: when 
can a disappointed beneficiary sue the drafting attorney for 
malpractice? The doctrine of privity confronts the spectre of the 
irresolute or inconclusive testator, yet courts have developed some 
dividing lines that differ from those they have developed 
surrounding harmless error. Privity seems to offer another 
illustration of how bright-line rules do not necessarily achieve 
dispository intent, although the privity rules do achieve certainty 
on only allowing final dispository statements (that are incomplete 
or show a lack of resolution) to provide a basis for a malpractice 
action. This commentary applauds Professor Baron’s achievement 
in focusing us on the limits of the wills reform doctrines and the 
significance of accounting for different types of testators. 
                                                                                                     
 * Harold H. Greene Professor of Law, George Washington University 
Law School. Thanks to Jane Baron for her engagement with this comment. 
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In Irresolute Testators,1 Professor Baron raises a series of 
fascinating issues about seemingly progressive developments in 
wills law. I am honored to have this opportunity to respond to her 
masterful, thoughtful, and thought-provoking article. Irresolute 
Testators adds a much-needed—and contrary—layer to the 
conventional story of wills reform doctrine, providing an analysis 
of relevant statutory interpretation and court decisions. In doing 
so, it tells numerous complex stories that explore the more 
fundamental constraints on potential changes to wills doctrine 
and builds on Professor Baron’s extraordinary earlier works.2 
Reformers, scholars, and practitioners both within and outside of 
the trusts and estates field can learn much from this rich and 
detailed account of the possibilities and limits of reforming wills 
law. 
First, she suggests that the movement of progress in wills 
doctrine—exemplified by the developments of substantial 
compliance, mistake, and harmless error—do not, theoretically, 
go quite as far as courts have taken the doctrines in practice. 
These reforms, codified in statutes and written in the 
Restatement, are designed to complement the goals of the Wills 
Act, that is, recognition of a reliable writing3 that represents the 
decedent’s “finalized testamentary intent”4 created by the 
rational testator. They seek to assess whether the alleged writing 
sought to be probated is, in fact, a “will”5 by excusing fairly 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Jane B. Baron, Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law, 
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (2016). 
 2.  E.g., Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity, and Testamentary 
Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1055 (1987) (discussing the “insane 
delusion” principle in wills law); Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 
IND. LJ. 155, 202 (1989) (describing wills law as anachronistic); Jane B. Baron, 
Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 268 (1994) (noting the importance 
of storytelling in critiquing objectivity). 
 3.  The definition of a writing is, actually, ambiguous. See, e.g., NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 132.119, 136.185 (allowing for electronic wills) (2016); In re Estate 
of Javier Castro, No. 2013ES00140 (Lorain Cnty. Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 19, 
2013) (permitting probate of an electronic will pursuant to the Ohio version of 
the harmless error rule—OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24 (2016)); Anthony R. La 
Ratta & Melissa B. Osorio, What’s in A Name? Writings Intended As Wills, 28 
PROB. & PROP. 47, 50 (2014) (“The type of writing necessary to create a valid will 
is evolving.”). 
 4.  Baron, supra note 1, at 8. 
 5.  “[T]he will execution reform permits investigation of a testator’s intent 
that a document serve as a will, not the testator’s dispositive intent.” Baron, 
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technical requirements. Accordingly, the article focuses on 
whether the heightened evidentiary standard of proving defects 
by clear and convincing evidence actually serves as the limit the 
drafters anticipated on use of the reform doctrines.6 
This leads to a second, and related, point: she draws a 
distinction between whether a document is, indeed, a will rather 
than simply an expression of the decedent’s intent for what 
should, eventually, be included in a will.7 The reforms are 
designed to address the decedent’s “fixed intent, and address only 
the problem of inadvertent errors in setting out those wishes.”8  
In interpreting the reform doctrines, she argues, courts may “find 
it difficult to stay within the limits” contemplated by the 
reforms.9 Instead, they inquire into whether the writing 
establishes the decedent’s intent, even though the writings’ 
noncompliance with conventional Wills Act rules goes far beyond 
the technical problems and—under appropriate interpretation of 
the savings doctrines—might not actually qualify as wills. 
Finally, and most critically, she suggests that wills law faces 
an inherent contradiction: it posits a rational testator who is 
protected by the reform doctrines, but the law also recognizes the 
existence of a more emotionally vulnerable, less definitive 
testator who is not explicitly protected by the reforms, and whom 
                                                                                                     
supra note 1, at 39.   
 6.  Baron’s article notes that some courts do apply the clear and convincing 
standard in the manner seemingly intended by the reformers, but other courts 
have had various problems, such as uncertainty as to the precise meaning of the 
standard or whether clear and convincing evidence of the decedent’s dispository 
intent—rather than that the decedent intended a particular document to be a 
will—is adequate to satisfy the doctrines. Baron, supra note 1, at 8–27. For an 
alternative critique of these doctrines, see Reid Kress Weisbord, The Advisory 
Function of Law, 90 TUL. L. REV. 129, 184 (2015) (noting the expense of 
establishing error). Interestingly, although there was concern that “a flood of 
litigation” might result from adoption of the harmless error standard, an 
empirical sample of California cases found none that involved the issue. Thomas 
E. Simmons, Wills Above Ground, 23 ELDER L.J. 343, 362 (2016). 
 7.  Mark Glover argues that conventional Wills Act doctrine is risk-averse 
to probating an inauthentic will and results in false-negative outcomes that 
prevent genuine wills from being probated. See Mark Glover, Minimizing 
Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335–404 (2016) (concluding that 
“the conventional law heavily allocates risk in favor of false-negative outcomes, 
and does not minimize the overall risk of probate errors”). 
 8.  Baron, supra note 1, at 68. 
 9.  Id. at 69.  
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courts often find sympathetic.10 She argues that the reform 
doctrines do not adequately resolve the tensions between these 
two different testators. 
In identifying different images of testators, Professor Baron 
has uncovered discords that are, as she suggests, fundamental to 
contemporary wills law. While traditional probate law would 
never validate a document that was everything-but-a-will in 
terms of formalities—or would not reform a document that 
mislabeled a beneficiary—the modern reform doctrines have, 
perhaps inadvertently, permitted courts to give effect to such a 
document or a bequest. 
By causing us to reflect on the distinctions between 
dispository intent and a formal writing recognizable as a final 
statement—on rational and boundedly rational testators as well 
as on final and almost-final declarations—Baron’s article 
brilliantly focuses us on the art and craft of line-drawing in wills 
law. She notes some of the other areas in which line-drawing 
proves to be a challenge, and I briefly want to comment on 
another context that provides an example of both safe harbors 
and individualized decision-making, yet similarly raises issues 
about testators whose final intent is not clearly expressed: When 
can a disappointed beneficiary sue the drafting attorney for 
malpractice?  
The doctrine of privity confronts the spectre of the irresolute 
or inconclusive testator, yet courts have developed some dividing 
lines that differ from those they have developed surrounding 
harmless error. This area may exemplify the approach that Baron 
suggests the reform doctrines are designed to provide, and it 
shows the promises and limits of clear rules.11 Privity seems to 
                                                                                                     
 10.  Professor Baron points out the gendered nature of this language and 
explicitly uses “the male pronoun throughout [her] article to avoid any 
suggestion that male testators are resolute and female testators irresolute.” Id. 
at 5 n.1.   
 11.  See, e.g., Rydde v. Morris, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009) (“Having relaxed 
the traditional privity requirement in legal malpractice claims, [we] 
nevertheless draw the line and refuse for compelling policy reasons to permit a 
malpractice claim by a non-client for negligent failure to draft a will.”). One 
major difference is that the reform doctrines apply regardless of whether an 
attorney is involved, while malpractice claims only involve attorney-drafted 
wills, so the policy of protecting lawyers is implicit in some of the limitations on 
malpractice claims. For example, there is a concern that lawyers liable to 
disappointed beneficiaries will experience a conflict of interest with divided 
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offer another illustration of how bright-line rules do not 
necessarily achieve dispository intent, although the privity rules 
do achieve certainty on only allowing final dispository statements 
(that are incomplete or show a lack of resolution) to provide a 
basis for a malpractice action. 
A malpractice claim typically requires: (1) the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship (privity); (2) a duty to use such skill, 
prudence, and diligence as other attorneys commonly possess and 
exercise; (3) the attorney’s breach of duty; and (4) damage to the 
client. The traditional rule was that attorneys owed duties only to 
their clients; third party potential beneficiaries could not bring 
suits against a drafting attorney. Strict privity began to crumble, 
however, during the second half of the twentieth century,12 with 
most states willing to relax the privity bar at least in some 
circumstances so that the estate or a disappointed beneficiary can 
sue an attorney for malpractice.13 Notwithstanding a lack of 
privity, courts have found a duty where the executed 
testamentary document itself reflects the testator’s undisputed 
intent that the plaintiff receive a specific benefit and that intent 
is frustrated.14 In deciding whether to excuse privity, courts often 
apply a balancing test that looks at the public interest. 
                                                                                                     
loyalties, an issue not presented in the harmless error context. And, of course, 
the issues concerning “Irresolute Testators” include cases both with and without 
attorney involvement. The role of the attorney as mediator between the 
testator’s actual intent and the ultimate product results in additional 
uncertainty as to whether the error resulted from the testator’s lack of 
decisiveness or the attorney’s malpractice. Nonetheless, the question of how far 
to move beyond a traditional and confining law involving estate planning is 
clearly presented. 
 12.  See Hall v. Kalfayan, 190 Cal. App. 4th 927, 933 (Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]his 
strict privity test was rejected in a trio of cases involving testamentary 
instruments.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“Duty of Care to Certain Nonclients”); Daniel R. Nappier, Note, Blurred Lines: 
Analyzing an Attorney's Duties to A Fiduciary-Client's Beneficiaries, 71 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 2609, 2621 (2014) (“Many . . . cases have concluded that a fiduciary’s attorney does 
owe duties to beneficiaries.”). 
 13.  See Martin D. Begleiter, The Gambler Breaks Even: Legal Malpractice 
in Complicated Estate Planning Cases, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 277, 281–82 (2003) 
(describing approaches taken by states regarding privity); Gerry W. Beyer, 
Avoid Being A Defendant: Estate Planning Malpractice and Ethical Concerns, 5 
ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 224, 232 (2015) (same); Karen J. Sneddon, 
Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills and Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
683, 714 (2011) (same). 
 14.  See Paul v. Patton, 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 837 (2015) (citing cases 
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By contrast, courts have resolutely refused to relax the 
privity bar when it comes to non-execution, holding that “an 
attorney owes no duty of care to an intended will beneficiary to 
have the will executed promptly” or even at all.15 That is, in the 
absence of a valid will, courts find no duty. For example, in a 
1995 California case, Mary Ann Borina’s will provided for trust 
income to her husband and sister.16 She met with an attorney to 
discuss a new will under which her husband would receive all of 
the trust income.17  Once the attorney delivered a rough draft of 
the new will to Borina for review, she told him she needed to 
discuss the revised estate plan with her sister before finalizing 
the new will.18 Borina died six months later, with the new will 
unexecuted.19 The court found that there was no duty to the 
husband, the beneficiary of the new, but unexecuted, will.20 These 
cases do seem to involve the irresolute testator of Baron’s title. 
But, of course, they also illustrate that privity is more likely than 
not to be a bar when the testator “conform[s] to the paradigm”21 
and there actually is a will; this conformity, Baron suggests, “is 
more important to the outcome of these cases than the 
evidentiary standard.”22 Or, in Sisson v. Jankowski,23 the 
decedent did not want to die intestate, and the court 
acknowledged that “the unexecuted will accurately expressed his 
intent to pass his entire estate to the plaintiff.”24 Nonetheless, the 
will remained unexecuted because of a minor change in 
contingent beneficiaries.25 
                                                                                                     
reflecting the view “that the testator’s intent is central to the duty analysis”). 
 15.  Parks v. Fink, 293 P.3d 1275, 1281 (Wa. 2013); see also Riso v. Dwyer, 
No. 2015-0361, 2016 WL 1069068, at *3 (N.H. Mar. 18, 2016) (concluding that 
because there was still a “potential for conflict as to who [the testator’s] 
beneficiary would be,” the attorney defendants “did not owe a duty to the 
plaintiffs”). 
 16.   Radovich v. Locke-Paddon, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 574 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 17.  Id. 
 18. Id. at 575.  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 584. 
 21.  Baron, supra note 1, at 55 
 22. Id. 
 23.  809 A.2d 1265 (N.H. 2002). 
 24.  Id. at 1266. 
 25.  See id. at 1266 (noting that, “rather than modifying the will 
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This stringent line in cases where a will has not actually 
been executed for malpractice purposes is not echoed in the 
existing harmless error cases that Baron discusses. In those 
reform cases in her article, courts are willing to admit to probate 
improperly executed wills or arguably not final statements of 
intention designed to constitute a will. And it is those cases which 
Baron suggests function to stretch the reform doctrines beyond 
where they may have been intended to go.  Wills law reforms, as 
Baron’s article argues, are designed to save the testator who has 
an undisputed intent. Thus, it is not surprising that courts 
reforming privity doctrine would draw a similar distinction 
between testators who clearly had reached a finalized intent, as 
evidenced by an executed will, and those who might in fact have 
reached a finalized intent, but did not have the executed will as 
evidence of their resoluteness. 
In titling her article Irresolute Testators, Baron suggests that 
the decedents were not entirely certain of their dispository 
wishes. In some of the cases, that is undoubtedly true. Indeed, 
the problem is sometimes hesitancy about particular outcomes 
(the need to discuss a will change with a sister). Nonetheless, in 
others, there seems strong—sometimes beyond a reasonable 
doubt—evidence of the testator’s intent. It often appears to be 
just plain old lawyer failure (leaving a residuary clause 
unfinished in Herceg). Yes, Charles Kuralt was sophisticated, but 
did he really understand that a typed will would supersede an 
earlier holographic will?26 Similarly, in the unexecuted wills 
cases, where courts are unwilling to relax the privity bar to 
consider malpractice claims, there is sometimes quite reasonable 
doubt that the decedents intended the draft writings to become 
final testamentary statements or even uncertainty that the 
documents contained those wishes; yet there are also cases where 
                                                                                                     
immediately to include a hand-written contingent beneficiary 
clause . . . Attorney Jankowski left without obtaining the decedent’s signature to 
the will”). 
 26.  Baron notes that Kuralt did not involve substantial 
compliance/harmless error. For further discussion of how nonlawyers 
understand the law, see generally Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making 
Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of How People Approach the Wealth 
Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325 (2015). 
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it was the lawyer’s failure to translate wishes into written 
certainty (the Sisson decedent did not want to die intestate).  
Consequently, rather than labeling the tension as one 
between differing testator selves who are “rational” and 
“irresolute,”27 we might instead conceptualize the sometimes 
contradictory trends as tensions between whether to apply rules 
versus standards,28 as well as between the complete versus the 
incomplete. That is, the cases often involve decedents who have 
made final choices, but have, at least arguably, not adequately 
documented their choices. They are not—or at least frequently 
are not—irresolute. They had specific goals. Louise Macool knew 
what she wanted, but her lawyer may have felt irresolute about 
whether he knew what she wanted; Kuralt apparently did not 
realize the nature of his illness, or he would have called in the 
lawyers before writing the document that (ultimately) qualified 
as a holographic will. Or, the post-will execution savings 
doctrines of ademption and antilapse protect against a failure to 
anticipate contingencies; the testator might well have intended to 
allow descendants of the original devisee to inherit something, 
but simply did not contemplate a sale of a specific item or the 
death of the original devisee. The intentions may be final and 
decisive, but not enough planning occurred, the wrong questions 
were asked, or the wrong legal formalities were followed. The 
two—resolute and irresolute testator—are, in fact, ends on a 
continuum of dispository wishes that is often defined by lawyer 
competence.29 
                                                                                                     
 27.  Irresolute means feeling hesitant, uncertain. Interestingly, women 
appear somewhat more likely than men to use precatory (non-directive) words 
in their wills. See Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and 
the Law of Precatory Words in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 38–39 (2007) 
(discussing an empirical research showing that “sex explains roughly 1.7% of 
the variability in precatory language”); Karen J. Sneddon, Not Your Mother's 
Will: Gender, Language, and Wills, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1535, 1567 (2015) 
(“Because precatory language and expressive language appear to be included 
more in the Wills of women than the Wills of men, the use may reflect the 
perpetuation of gender stereotypes about gender appropriate language or could 
be a legacy of testamentary access or a combination of both.”). 
 28.  See Baron, supra note 1, at 73; see also Daniel B. Kelly, Toward 
Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 
872 (2012) (“[R]ules entail more predictability and consistency than 
standards.”).  
 29.  As Baron states, 
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Whether the testators are actually irresolute or their final 
dispository wishes are definitive but—based on the requisite 
formalities—incompletely articulated, ultimately, Baron calls 
attention to the larger issues of the sometimes paradoxical 
manner in which the legal system approaches dispository intent. 
Wills law has, for centuries, attempted to establish two distinct 
categories, the intestate decedent and the rational testator. The 
irresolute, or (my preferred term) the incomplete, testator adds 
another significant dimension altogether that, moving forward, 
challenges existing wills doctrine.30 
Bright-line rules and neat categories are appealing; they 
make decisions easy. And, when a will falls into the safe harbor 
that Baron identifies, the decision is easy. Or, when there is no 
writing, intestacy serves as a similar safe harbor.31 Tantalizingly, 
the article does not suggest how the law might more 
appropriately balance these two “selves”—should we, for example, 
move towards recognizing final statements of intent, even if there 
is no clear and convincing evidence of compliance with the Wills 
Act?32 In a world of increasingly common nonprobate transfers, 
                                                                                                     
I do not wish to overdraw the comparison between the two 
testamentary selves. It is surely not the case that some people are 
entirely rational in the traditional, choosing sense, while others 
experience only the bounded rationality of the erring testator. Nor is 
it true that careful, self-reliant testators will never make mistakes, 
while less careful testators will always make them. 
Baron, supra note 1, at 73. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  That is not to say that a valid will may not be challenged, or that 
intestacy is easy. See generally SUSAN GARY, JEROME BORISON, NAOMI CAHN & 
PAULA MONOPOLI, CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES (2d ed. 
2014) (discussing challenges of intestacy and will contests); Carly McKeeman, ‘I 
Never Meant to Cause You Any Sorrow’—Lessons from Prince on Intestacy, ABA 
(May 9, 2016), http://abaforlawstudents.com/2016/05/09/never-meant-cause-
sorrow-lessons-prince-intestacy/ (last visited June 30, 2016) (noting the 
potential heirs to Prince’s fortune along with the estate tax consequences of the 
lack of planning) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Maria 
Puente, “Heirs” to Prince’s Millions are Multiplying, USA TODAY (Jun 16, 2016), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/2016/06/14/would--heirs-princes-
millions-multiplying/85891872/ (last visited June 30, 2016) (detailing the 
complexities of determining heirs to the singer, Prince) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 32.  See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the 
Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
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what role, after all, does the safe harbor of wills, with its 
ritualized formalities, still serve? By suggesting the need to ask 
these questions that are fundamental to trusts and estates, 
Baron goes far in moving the law towards recognition, if not 
reconciliation, of the differing testamentary selves.    
 
                                                                                                     
 
